We formalize the phenomenon of disruptive technologies that initially serve isolated market niches and, as they mature, expand to displace established technologies from mainstream segments. Using a novel model of horizontal and vertical di®erentiation with discrete customer segmentation, we show how the emergence of technology competition depends on numerous factors including the number of¯rms using each technology, the size of the di®erent market segments, the trajectory of technological advance, and the extent to which consumers have decreasing marginal utility from product improvements. Our theory suggests a richer and more dynamic approach to market de¯nition than the static analysis of substitution usually employed in antitrust deliberations.
Introduction
New technologies are often commercialized in a specialized niche. Some stay in their niche, while others go on to penetrate mainstream segments and compete with incumbent technologies. Long studied by historians of technology (e.g., Basalla, 1988) ; economic historians (e.g., Rosenberg, 1976) , and business and marketing strategists (e.g., Foster, 1986; Moore, 1994) , the emergence of technology competition has received renewed attention through the work of Christensen (1997) , which originated with an analysis of the competitive dynamics in the hard disk drive industry. Consider the following characterization:
In 1985, the hard disk drive market for personal computers was divided into two segments: desktop computer users who cared about capacity, and portable computer users who cared about both capacity and portability. A 5.25-inch disk technology, which o®ered higher capacity than the 3.5-inch alternative, was used in the desktop segment. The 3.5-inch hard drives, which were smaller and more energy e±cient, served the emerging market for portable computers. Thus, the two technologies were initially isolated, each limited to serving consumers in a di®erent market segment. With time, the performance of both technologies improved, but the 5.25-inch drives always o®ered signi¯cantly higher capacity than the 3.5-inch drives. By 1988, however, the 3.5-inch drives had expended from the portable segment to capture the low-end of the desktop segment.
Christensen terms technologies like the 3.5-inch drives disruptive technologies. Such technologies o®er a novel mix of attributes compared to the established technology, but are inferior to the established technology according to the needs of consumers in the primary (mainstream) market segment. The disruptive technology is, therefore, initially purchased by consumers in a secondary (niche) market segment who place high value on the new technology's attribute mix. As the new technology matures, its performance improves, but its perceived quality in the primary segment remains inferior to that of the established technology.
Despite this performance inferiority, the new technology enters the primary segment and captures the low-end from the established technology. Christensen (1997) documents similar dynamics in a variety of settings including laser and inkjet printers, minimill and integrated steel plants, and department store and discount store retail formats.
The idea of disruptive technologies has had a profound e®ect on the way in which both scholars and managers approach the management of technology. For scholars, disruptive technologies highlight the question of the boundaries of technology competition and how those boundaries change over time (Adner, 2001 ).
For managers, disruptive technologies highlight the danger posed to incumbent rms from too quickly dismissing new technologies as inferior and irrelevant to their market positions. 1 The question of whether or not two technologies compete has not, however, been the focus of formal economic theorizing.
One can interpret the vast economics literature on product di®erentiation as being about technology competition. For example, di®erent positions in a
Hotelling model can be interpreted as arising from¯rms using di®erent technologies. However, the received literature does not address the general issue of the emergence of competition between distinct technologies and, moreover, existing models are not well suited for analyzing the particular dynamics of disruption described above.
One limitation of the received literature is that consumer heterogeneity is usually assumed to be continuous, rather than segmented discretely. Further, existing models that combine horizontal and vertical di®erentiation are not very 1 See for example the January 25, 1999 Forbes cover story \Danger: Stealth Attack," about Christensen and the challenge posed by disruptive technologies.
tractable (Neven and Thisse, 1990; Heeb, 2001 ). Given these two limitations, one cannot (easily) use existing models to study the expansion of a new technology from a discrete niche segment to the low-end of the mainstream segment. 2 In addition, because the literature assumes Bertrand price competition, there is only a single¯rm at each position. 3 Thus, these models do not make a clear distinction between¯rms and technologies and hence cannot elucidate the e®ect of competition among multiple¯rms using a given technology on the emergence of competition between technologies.
We develop a novel model of vertical and horizontal di®erentiation that is well suited to studying the emergence of competition between distinct technologies. 4 There are two product technologies|a new technology and an established technology|which di®er in their marginal costs of production and in the attributes of their associated products. These attributes improve over time as the technologies mature. Improvement is along a¯xed technology trajectory that determine the relative attribute levels. We focus on Cournot competition in which there are an arbitrary number of¯rms using each of the two technologies. We check the robustness of our main results by extending the analysis to a Bertrand duopoly where there is one¯rm using each technology.
Consumers belong to one of two discrete segments|a primary segment and a secondary segment. 5 A consumer's perceived quality of a product depends on how they value its mix of attributes. The de¯ning feature of a market segment is that all consumers in the segment have the same perceived quality for a given product, while quality perceptions may vary across segments. Thus, segments capture horizontal di®erentiation. Within segments, consumers vary in their willingness-to-pay for quality as in a standard model of vertical di®erentiation.
The established technology is perceived as the higher quality alternative by the primary segment and the new technology is perceived as the higher quality alternative in the secondary segment. We assume that there is no price discrimination, based on either market segment or willingness-to-pay.
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Our main research question is whether or not competition emerges between the two technologies; that is, whether or not the new technology is disruptive. In the initial excitement surrounding Christensen's work, analysts and incumbents tended to see disruptive threats everywhere. 7 That many of these threats did not materialize highlights the importance of distinguishing between disruptive threats and technologies that will remain in an isolated segment.
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Our analytic approach is to focus on the incentives for¯rms using the new technology to enter and hence disrupt the primary segment. To do this, we identify an isolated equilibrium in which¯rms optimize as if the new technology was limited to the secondary segment. We then identify the factors that create an incentive for¯rms using the new technology to deviate from this equilibrium 6 In the economics literature, our model is well motivated by Sutton's (1998, chapter 6) description of the°ow meter industry where there are multiple technologies (e.g., electromagnetic and turbine°ow meters) that di®er along multiple attributes (e.g., ease of instalation and durability) and where customers can be segmented based on type of application (e.g., oil versus gas pipelines). 7 For example, consider the following quote from The Economist : \Starting with this issue, The Economist Technology Quarterly will o®er readers a foretaste of what new developments are threatening|no, guaranteeing|to disrupt the way business is done in the years ahead" (December 9, 2000). 8 For example, Porter (2001) claims that incumbents were too quick to treat new internetbased business models as disruptive technologies.
and disrupt the primary segment.
Our model captures the basic dynamic in which new technologies¯rst enter the secondary segment and then, as they mature, sometimes expand into the primary segment as well. We¯nd that whether the new technology is disruptive depends on the degree of similarity in preferences across segments, the technology trajectories, and the extent of decreasing marginal utility from product improvement, as well as more traditional parameters such as the size of the two segments, the marginal costs of the technologies and the number of¯rms using each technology.
The intuition for our results rests on an understanding of the demand function faced by¯rms using the new technology. For su±ciently high prices (or equivalently low output), their product is only consumed by the secondary segment because that is where the new technology creates the most value. For su±ciently low price (or equivalently high output), the product based on the new technology is disruptive. Speci¯cally, it is purchased by those consumers in the primary segment who are most willing to trade-o® quality for a lower price (i.e., the low-end consumers). Thus, the decision by¯rms using the new technology to disrupt the primary market involves moving from a high price, low volume \niche" strategy to a low price, high volume \mass market" strategy.
Consider, for example, the e®ect of the marginal cost of each technology on disruption. The lower the marginal cost of the new technology, the more attractive is a high volume strategy and the more likely it is that the new technology is disruptive. On the other hand, the lower the marginal costs of the established technology, the greater the optimal output of¯rms using that technology and hence the lower the scope for¯rms using the new technology to increase their volumes by disrupting the primary market. Thus, lower costs of the established technology make disruption less likely.
By characterizing the boundaries of technology competition, this paper contributes to debates about market de¯nition that are often central to antitrust cases. The standard approaches to market de¯nition in antitrust deliberations focus on the degree of substitution between products as measured by both own-price and cross-price elasticities. This approach has been criticized as being inherently static, and hence unable to accommodate the possibility of future competition from alternative technologies (Teece and Coleman, 1998) . 9 In contrast, our model explicitly incorporates dynamics by allowing product attributes to improve over time. Moreover, we go beyond the standard focus on consumers' willingness to substitute and identify multiple factors that determine the boundaries of competition. Thus, for example, we¯nd that one of the key drivers of whether a new technology currently in a niche will later compete with an established technology is the extent to which consumer utility exhibits decreasing returns to product improvements. The greater such decreasing returns, the more consumers' quality assessments converge over time. As result, a smaller price cut is required to enter the mainstream segment and technology competition is more likely to occur.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 de¯nes the model and Section 3 characterizes the demand functions. Section 4 de¯nes the benchmark isolated equilibrium. Section 5 establishes our approach to identifying the e®ect of the model parameters on the existence of that equilibrium. Sections 6 and 7 characterize how the boundaries of competition at a given point in time depend on the parameters of the model. Section 8 characterizes how the boundaries of competition change over time. Section 9 extends the analysis to Bertrand competition and to allow for an endogenous number of¯rms. The paper concludes with 9 See also the antitrust case Bourns, Inc v Raychem Corporation, US District Court, Central District of California, Case No CV 98-1765 CM and the associated discussion in Pleatsikas and Teece (2001) for problems with using traditional approaches to market de¯nition in settings characterized by multiple evolving technologies and multiple customer segments. Section 10.
The Model
We divide the model speci¯cation into four parts, as follows.
Consumers
A consumer's payo® from consuming one unit of a product is µv ¡ p, where v is the perceived quality of the product, µ is the consumer's willingness-to-pay for quality, and p is the price of the product. Consumers purchase one unit of the product that has the highest payo®, unless all payo®s are negative in which case they do not purchase.
Consumers belong to either a primary market segment or to a secondary market segment, which we index by i = 1; 2, respectively. The size of segment i is S i > 0. The de¯ning feature of a market segment is that all consumers in the segment have the same perception of product quality (v), while consumers in di®erent segments may have di®erent perceptions of product quality (details given below). Consumers within a segment vary in their willingness-to-pay for quality. In particular, we assume that µ » U[0; 1] in each segment.
Technologies
There is a new technology and an established technology, which we index by Á = N for the new technology and by Á = E for the established technology.
The marginal cost of the new product (i.e., the product made with the new technology) is denoted c N¸0 . The marginal cost of the established product (i.e., the product made with the established technology) is denoted c E¸0 .
The perceived quality of the new product for consumers in the primary seg-ment is denoted v 1 , while the perceived quality of the new product for consumers in the secondary segment is denoted v 2 . The perceived quality of the established product in the primary segment is denoted v E , while its perceived quality in the secondary segment is assumed to be 0.
10 Consistent with Christensen's description of disruptive technologies as having lower quality in the primary segment, we assume that v E > v 1 and because the new technology is well suited to the secondary segment we assume that v 2¸v1 .
Product Attributes and Perceived Quality
Following Lancaster (1971), we model the perceived quality of the new product as coming from its underlying attributes, which we assume to be improving over time. In particular, the new product has two attributes x and y which improve according to
where t¸0 indexes the maturity of the technology and°2 [0; 1] is the technology trajectory.
A consumer's perceived quality is a function of a product's attributes and a preference parameter ® i that varies across segments. We denote this function by V (x; y; ®) and assume that it is strictly increasing in each of its¯rst two arguments. The perceived quality of the new product by consumers in segment i is then v i = V (x; y; ® i ).
We consider four possible utility functions:
where¯2 (0; 1] parameterizes the extent of decreasing returns to product improvements for the¯rst two utility functions. 11 Note that higher values of ® are associated with greater importance of attribute x.
At times we explicitly write v 1 (t) and v 2 (t) to re°ect that perceived qualities are an (increasing) function of t. We restrict attention to t¸t N where v 2 (t N ) = c N because before this point no consumer values the new product above marginal cost.
We do not explicitly link the perceived quality of the established product to underlying attributes, but rather make some general assumptions about how its quality in the primary segment evolves with t. We assume that v 0 E (t)¸0 and that v E (t N ) > c E , which assures that there is positive output of the established product when the new technology¯rst becomes viable. For bounded utility, we additionally assume that v E (t) · K for all t.
Firms and Competition
There are n E¸1¯r ms using the established technology and we refer to these as established-technology¯rms. There are n N¸1¯r ms using the new technology and we refer to these as new-technology¯rms. We assume that at least one of the¯rms using the new technology does not use the established technology.
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We introduce the following notation for¯rm output. Let q N;k for k = 1; : : : n N denote the output of new products by each of the new-technology¯rms and q E;k for k = 1; : : : n E denote the output of the established product by each of the established-technology¯rms. Let Q Á = P n Á k=1 q Á;k for Á = N; E be the total output of each type of product.
Prices vary across new and established products. Let P N¸0 and P E¸0 denote the price of new and established products, respectively. Prices do not vary across¯rms using the same technology as their products are homogeneous. Nor do prices vary across consumers as there is no price discrimination based on either market segment or on willingness-to-pay. Let P N (Q N ; Q E ) and P E (Q E ; Q N ) be the inverse demand curves.
A Cournot equilibrium is a set of quantities for each¯rm which satisfy 
The Demand Functions
We start the analysis by characterizing consumer demand for each of the products.
We¯rst derive the demand curves and then the inverse demand curves that are needed to characterize Cournot equilibria. We then characterize the relationship between disruption and demand.
Consider the demand for the new product. Part of the demand comes from consumers in the secondary segment. For these consumers, the established product is not relevant as its perceived quality is 0. Thus, consumers are choosing between buying the new product and buying no product at all. All consumers for whom µv 2 ¡ P N > 0 or equivalently µ > P N =v 2 buy the new product. Given that µ » U [0; 1] and that the measure of segment 2 consumers is S 2 , demand for the new product from this segment (i.e., the measure of segment 2 consumers with
Now consider whether there is demand for the new product coming from the primary segment. Consumers in this segment have two alternatives to the new product: buying nothing for a payo® of 0 and buying the established product for a payo® of µv E ¡ P E . When there exists a µ 2 [0; 1] such that µv 1 ¡ P N > maxfµv E ¡ P E ; 0g at least some consumers strictly prefer the new product. Since µv 1 ¡ P N ¡ maxfµv E ¡ P E ; 0g is increasing in µ up to P E =v E and decreasing thereafter, the new product has positive demand from the primary segment when
Thus for P N su±ciently low relative to P E , some consumers in the primary segment purchase the new product.
Finally, consider the extent of demand in the primary segment, given that it exists. If the price of the new product is so low that
then even the consumer with the highest willingness-to-pay for quality (µ = 1) prefers the new product to the established product. In this case, all consumers for whom µv 1 ¡ P N > 0 buy, which results in a demand of
however, P N is higher, so that v 1 ¡ P N < v E ¡ P E , then consumers with a su±ciently high willingness-to-pay will still prefer the established product. The indi®erent consumer has µv 1 ¡ P N = µv E ¡ P E . Hence, only consumers with 
. Putting these results together, and extending the analysis to the established product, we have the following result.
Lemma 3.1. The demand function for the new product is
and the demand for the established product is
where
Proof The derivation of Q N (P N ; P E ) is given in the text. The derivation of Q E (P E ; P N ) is as follows. Demand can only come from segment 1, as the per-ceived quality of the established product in segment 2 is 0. For P E < v E P N =v 1 , no consumer in segment 1 buys the new product (see text above) and the established product is bought by those with µv E ¡ P E > 0, which yields a demand of
, then all consumers prefer the new product to the established product and demand is 0. For intermediate values of P E , the indi®erent consumer is the one for whom µv 1 ¡ P N = µv E ¡ P E and demand is
To characterize Cournot equilibria we need inverse demand curves. These are found by taking as given the total output of each type of product, Q N and Q E , and solving for the market clearing prices for which Q N = Q N (P N ; P E ) and Lemma 3.2. When Q E · S 1 , the inverse demand function for the new product is
; 0g. The inverse demand function for the established product when Q N · S 2 is
Proof See Appendix.
We now de¯ne when the new technology is disruptive and then characterize the relationship between disruption and demand. 
with price competition and 0 < P E < v E , the new technology is disruptive for P N su±ciently low P N < ¹ P N (P E ).
(ii) When the new technology is disruptive, there exist 0 < µ 1 < µ 2 · 1 such that low-end consumers, those with µ 2 (µ 1 ; µ 2 ), buy the new product and high-end consumers, those with µ > µ 2 , buy the established product.
(iii) The slopes of both the new and the established product inverse demand curves decrease with an expansion of Q N that leads to disruption:
Proof Parts (i) and (ii) follow from Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2. For part (iii), sup-
of which are greater than ¡v E =S 1 . QED Part (i) of the proposition establishes that disruption arises from new-technologȳ rms pursuing a high output, and hence low price, strategy. Two factors create the price (or equivalently output) di®erential. First, the established product is present in the primary but not the secondary segment and hence selling the new product is harder there. In addition, new products have a higher perceived quality in the secondary segment and hence selling the new product is easier there.
(Thus, part (i) would not hold if Q E = 0 and v 1 = v 2 .) Part (ii) establishes that our model is consistent with the observation that disruptive technologies take the low-end of the primary segment. This follows from the assumption that they have the lower perceived quality in that segment.
Finally, part (iii) implies that disruption makes demand for both types of product more elastic. For the established product, this is because demand is more responsive to price changes when marginal consumers are considering a competing product rather than not purchasing. For the new product, this is because demand is more responsive when there are marginal consumers in both, rather than just one, segment. The kink in the new product demand curve, which creates the possibility of multiple locally optimal outputs, is important for the analysis in the next section.
The Isolated Equilibrium
To identify disruptive technologies we de¯ne a benchmark equilibrium in which the new technology is isolated in the secondary segment. The benchmark is the equilibrium when v 1 = 0. In this case, the new technology is clearly not disruptive as it is unattractive to customers in the primary segment. Thus, the two segments form independent markets. The primary segment is served only by the n E established-technology¯rms and they face the linear inverse demand curve
. The secondary segment is served only by the n N newtechnology¯rms and they face the linear inverse demand curve
. The equilibrium in each segment is then the standard n-¯rm Cournot outcome with symmetric costs and linear demand. Let Q I Á and P I Á for Á = N; E denote the total output and prices when the technologies are isolatd in this way.
Lemma 4.1. For v 1 = 0, the equilibrium prices and total output are
The equilibrium is symmetric in that each¯rm using technology Á has an output of the associated product given by q
Proof Suppose v 1 = 0. With a linear inverse demand function and symmetric costs there is a unique Cournot equilibrium, which is symmetric. With the speci¯c demand functions, equilibrium output is
), which lead to the stated total output and prices. QED (ii) If an isolated equilibrium does not exist, then the new technology is disruptive with positive probability.
If the new technology were disruptive in the isolated equilibrium, then the slope of the demand curve would be°atter than P N (Q N )|see Proposition 3.1, part (iii)|and hence the optimal output would be greater than q I N , which contradicts (Q I N ; Q I E ) being an equilibrium. In addition to the isolated equilibrium, there are two other possible Nash equilibria. A pure strategy equilibrium involving disruption and a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the new technology is disruptive with positive probability. 13 We now derive necessary and su±cient conditions for the existence of an isolated equilibrium. There are two ways in which the isolated equilibrium may breakdown. First, at the output levels (Q I N ; Q I E ) the new product could be bought by both segments, in which case q N E is not locally optimal due to the shift in the slope of the demand curve. Second, a new-technology¯rm might jump to a higher output level in order to penetrate the primary segment. Given the concavity of the new-product demand function, such a deviation might be globally optimal.
The optimal deviation onto the disruptive part of the demand curve by a¯rm using only the new technology iŝ
N is the total output of all but one new-technology¯rm in an isolated equilibrium.
14 LetQ = Q I ¡k +q be the total output at the optimal disruptive deviation and letP = P N (Q; Q I E ) and1 =q(P ¡ c E ) be the associated price and pro¯t. Global optimality of the isolated equilibrium then requires that 13 The mixed strategy arises because the best response to disruption by the established¯rm may be to increase output so much that disruption is no longer optimal for new-technologȳ rms. Outputs can be strategic complements in this model because of the°attening of the inverse demand curve that comes with disruption.
14 We consider deviations by¯rms using only the new technology because they have a greater incentive to disrupt. Disruption imposes a negative externality on¯rms using the established technology as it lowers the price of the established product. 
Proof See Appendix
In what follows, we are interested in the boundaries of the set of parameters for which the isolated equilibrium exists, i.e., those parameters for which ¢ I = 0.
According to part (ii) of Lemma 4.4, at this boundary a¯rm using (only) the new technology is indi®erent between an output q I N that does not lead to disruption and anotherq that does.
Linking Parameters to Equilibrium Existence
In order to make precise statements about how the existence of the isolated equilibrium depends on a given parameter of the model, we introduce the following de¯nition.
De¯nition 5.1. Let a = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g denote the set of parameters of a model.
An equilibrium of the model is increasing in the j th parameter if existence of the equilibrium for any vector fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g implies that the equilibrium exists for all feasible vectors fa 1 ; : : : ;â j ; : : : a n g such thatâ j > a j . An equilibrium of the model is decreasing in the jth parameter if existence of the equilibrium for any vector fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g implies that the equilibrium exists for all feasible vectors fa 1 ; : : : ;â j ; : : : a n g such thatâ j < a j .
An attractive feature of these de¯nitions is that they imply the existence of a critical value of a parameter above or below which the equilibrium exists.
15 See
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To make this statement precise, let a ¡ j denote values for all parameters other than jth and suppose that given these values the equilibrium may or may not exist depending on the value 
The E®ect of Size, Cost, Quality and Concentration
In this section, we consider the existence of an isolated equilibrium at a given point in time. Thus, we take as given the quality levels v 1 , v 2 and v E . Numerous parameters have an unambiguous e®ect on whether the new technology is isolated or disruptive.
of a j . If the equilibrium is increasing (decreasing) in a j , then there exists an ¹ a j (a ¡ j ) such that the equilibrium exists i® a j¸( ·) ¹ a j (a ¡j ). 
S
The isolated equilibrium exists
The isolated equilibrium exists for c E 2 (:22; :48). 16 If there is dependence and the equilibrium is increasing or decreasing in the parameter, then there exists a critical value of the parameter. 16 The upperbound occurs when c N = v 1 (1¡Q I E =S 1 ) at which point the entrant product does not appeal to any of the primary segment consumers unserved by the incumbents even when price is set to marginal cost. The lower bound occurs when c N is such that Q Applying this to the¯gure, as the isolated equilibrium is increasing in both c N and S 2 , and the critical value of S 2 is decreasing in c N .
The intuition for the results in Proposition 6.1 come from the fact that disruption occurs when a new-technology¯rm¯nds it pro¯table to pursue a low price, high volume strategy (Proposition 3.4, part (i)). The e®ect of each parameter comes from its impact on the pro¯tability of such a strategy relative to the pro¯tability of the lower volume, higher price strategy of remaining in the secondary segment. Thus, for example, the isolated equilibrium is increasing in v 1 because a higher quality of the new product in the primary segment means that the new-product price does not fall as much with disruption, which makes a disruptive strategy more attractive. On the other hand, disruption is less attractive as c N increases because higher costs reduce the margins that are earned on the increase in volume that comes with disruption. Thus, the isolated equilibrium is increasing in c N .
The e®ect of several of the parameters comes from their impact of the amount of additional volume generated by disruption. The bigger the size of the primary segment, the more volume generated by disruption, and hence, the new technology is more likely to be disruptive for larger values of S 1 . Relatedly, the more output produced by established-technology¯rms (Q I E ), the less primary segment demand is available for the new product and hence the lower the volume generated by disruption. From Lemma 4.1, we have that Q I E is decreasing in c E and hence the isolated equilibrium is decreasing in c E as well (i.e, disruption is more likely). Conversely, Q I E is increasing in v E and n E and hence these variables make disruption less likely.
The e®ect of the remaining parameters comes from their impact on the attractiveness of staying in the secondary segment. The larger the size of the secondary segment, the more attractive it is to stay there. The higher the new product's perceived quality in the secondary segment, the greater the price premium for staying there. Finally, the more¯rms there are competing in the secondary segment, the lower the price and the volume for any individual¯rm and the less attractive it is to stay there. Thus, the isolated equilibrium is increasing in S 2 and v 2 and decreasing in n N .
Many of these¯ndings are consistent with prior empirical work on disruptive technologies. For example, our¯nding that the likelihood of disruption increases
with the new technology's cost advantage (i.e., the isolated equilibrium is increasing in c N and decreasing in c E ) and the relative segment sizes (i.e., the isolated equilibrium is increasing in S 2 and decreasing in S 1 ) is consistent with Christensen's claims (1997, pages 15 and 81).
The E®ect of the Technology Tra jectory
This section focuses on the how the technology trajectory°, which determines the new product's mix of attributes, and thus its perceived quality in each segment, a®ects the likelihood of disruption. Recall that product attributes evolve according to x t =°t and y t = (1 ¡°)t and that quality in segment i is v i = V (x t ; y t ; ® i ).
We¯nd that the likelihood of disruption depends on how°compares to the segment preference parameters ® 1 and ® 2 , which determine the weight placed on each attribute in consumer utility functions.
We de¯ne the trajectory that maximizes the new product's perceived quality in segment i by°¤ i = arg max°V (°t; (1 ¡°)t; ® i ).
This°¤ i is well de¯ned for all four of the utility function that we consider, because V (°t; (1 ¡°)t; ® i ) is a concave function of°with an optimal value that is independent of t. Moreover, the optimal trajectory always satis¯es the following properties.
Lemma 7.1. The quality maximizing trajectory for segment i is increasing in
Shifts in the technology trajectory away from one segment's optimal trajectory towards the other segments optimum have an unambiguous e®ect on disruption. 
As the isolated equilibrium is decreasing in v 1 and increasing in v 2 , the two e®ects work in the same direction and the isolated equilibrium is increasing in°. For the case where ® 2 < ® 1 , the e®ect of°on the v i 's reverses and the isolated equilibrium is decreasing. Thus, we capture the intuitive idea that as the technology trajectory shifts away from the preferences of the secondary segment and towards the preferences of the primary segment, disruption becomes more likely.
17 Further, for ® 1 < 1=2 < ® 2 we have that°¤
The e®ect of changes in°outside of [°¤ 1 ;°¤ 2 ] is indeterminate for two reasons.
The¯rst reason is that both v 1 and v 2 move in the same direction, and hence the e®ect of°depends in part on which of the two is changing faster, which itself depends on the curvature of the utility function. Second, scaling up or down both quality levels has its own e®ect on disruption, as identi¯ed in the following lemma.
Lemma 7.3. For ® 1 = ® 2 and hence°¤ 1 =°¤ 2 , the isolated equilibrium is increasing in°for°<°¤ i and decreasing for°>°¤ i .
and these values are increasing in°for°<°¤ i and decreasing for°>°¤ i . If, for example, the qualities are increasing, the price charged on any given output is increasing as well, and the resulting higher margins encourage an increase in output, which makes disruption more likely.
This e®ect is also present when the ® i 's are di®erent and it may o®set the e®ect from any di®erential movements in the v i 's. Thus, factors like°= 2 [°¤ 1 ;°¤ 2 ] which a®ect the perceived quality in both segments in the same way, but at di®erent rates, have ambiguous e®ects on the likelihood of disruption.
The E®ect of Technological Advance
Disruptive technologies have an important dynamic element: they start in a new market segment and then move to the mainstream segment as they mature. In our model, technology maturity (t) causes attributes, and hence qualities, to improve over time. Recall that the there is positive output of the new product only after time t N and that the initial sales are in the secondary market segment. increasing in c N , S 2 , v 2 , v E , and n E while it is decreasing in c E , S 1 , v 1 , and n N .
Hence increasing the value of ½ H implies that ¢ I > 0 and disruption now occurs for a value of t greater than t D . Conversely, @¢ I =@½ L < 0 for ½ L 2 fc E ; S 1 ; v 1 ; n N g. Hence increasing the value of ½ L implies that ¢ I < 0 and disruption occurs for a value of t less than t D . QED
The factors that we identify as deterring disruption, also serve to delay disruption. As discussed in Section 6.1, when there exists a critical threshold for a parameter such that the technology is disruptive above that threshold, then the critical threshold is increasing in those parameters for which the isolated equilibrium is decreasing and decreasing in those for which it is increasing. Proposition 8.2 simply applies that logic to the threshold t D .
All that remains is to characterize whether the new technology is disruptive in the limit as t gets large. For all but the bounded utility function, the main e®ect of t ! 1 is that the ratio of marginal costs to perceived quality goes to zero. In this limit, whether or not disruption occurs depends on the following closed form expression.
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Lemma 8.3. In the limit as maxfc N ; c E g= minfv E ; v 1 ; v 2 g ! 0, the condition for an isolated equilibrium to exist converges to
where N = µ n N + 1
Proof See Appendix Inequality (8.1) is consistent with our prior results on the drivers of disruption:
it depends on the relative size of the two segments, the relative number of¯rms using each technology and the relative perceived quality of the new product across segments. As long as n N · n E , the right-hand side of the condition is less than 1 and hence disruption occurs if consumers in the two segments are su±ciently similar in terms of their assessment of the new product's quality. 20
There are several factors that determine the ratio v 1 (t)=v 2 (t). The¯rst is the extent of consumers' decreasing marginal utility from product improvements.
These are greatest for the bounded and log linear utility functions, for which lim t!1 (v 1 (t)=v 2 (t)) = 1. With Cobb-Douglas and linear exponential utility, decreasing marginal utility is less pronounced and v 1 (t)=v 2 (t) is a constant independent of t. In the case of Cobb-Douglas this constant is
. 19 Although we model the e®ect of t as coming entirely through increases in attributes, marginal production costs also tend to fall as technologies improve. Hence, even in the case of bounded utility Lemma 8.3 would apply if cost reductions caused maxfc N ; c E g=K to go to zero with t. 20 The factors from Proposition 6.1 that are missing in Lemma 8.3 are c E , c N and v E . The costs drop out because what matters is cost relative to quality, which is going to zero by assumption. Incumbent quality v E is absent because what matters for disruption is the output of the incumbents Q I E , which is independent of v E when c E =v E goes to zero.
We thus have the following. Proof If utility is not bounded, we have that lim t!1 (maxfc N ; c E g= minfv E (t); v 1 (t); v 2 (t)g) = 0 and an isolated equilibrium only exists when condition (8.1) is satis¯ed. For n E · n N , 4S 2 =(N (4S 2 + N S 1 )) < 1. For log linear utility the condition is then satis¯ed for t large. For the case of additive exponential we have
ence, for both additive exponential and Cobb-Douglas we have
and condition (8.1) is satis¯ed in each of the above limits for n E · n N . QED
As we have seen, di®erences in the number of¯rms using each technology can deter disruption. Thus, Proposition 8.4 restricts attention to n N · n E . For log utility, this restriction on rivalry is su±cient to assure disruption in the limit.
For bounded utility, the established technology might also be protected by a cost advantage.
For Cobb-Douglas and exponential utility, the limit behavior depends on the extent to which consumers in the primary segment have a greater appreciation for the new product (v 1 =v 2 ). Valuations diverge to the extent that the technology trajectory is skewed towards the attribute favored by the secondary segment. To the extent that segment preferences are homogeneous (® 1 close to ® 2 ) or that the trajectory is central (°close to 1=2), consumer perceptions converge and disruption occurs. Further, the stronger the decreasing marginal utility from product improvement (¯small), the more muted are any di®erences. 21
Our results are consistent with Christensen's observations regarding the dynamics of disruption and with his discussion of how disruption arises from \per-formance oversupply," which we formalize as decreasing marginal utility. Beyond consistency with existing observations, the value of our formalization is that it allows for new and more speci¯c insights into the in°uence of numerous factors including rivalry among¯rms using each technology, technology trajectories and attribute weightings, on the emergence of technology competition. Many of these are novel independent variables that can inform future empirical work in this area.
Extensions
The model can be extended along several lines. In Section 9.1 we consider
Bertrand competition and disruptive technologies that come not just \from below" (i.e., v 1 < v E ) but also \from above" (i.e., v 1 > v E ). In Section 9.2 we 21 Returning to the disk drive example, consider how°and a 2 a®ect the disruptive threat posed by 3.5-inch drives. The more technology advance improves capacity along with portability (i.e., the more central the trajectory) the greater the threat. In addition, the more weight the portable segment places on capacity, the greater the threat. explore the e®ect of endogenous entry. In Section 9.3, we discuss the implications of our results for a setting in which there are two technologies that both have the possibility to disrupt the others home segment.
Bertrand Competition
With price competition, we restrict attention to n N = n E = 1 as otherwise¯rms price at marginal cost. A Bertrand equilibrium is then a pair of prices P ¤ N and P ¤ E that satisfy
We do not need to rede¯ne the isolated equilibrium for the case of Bertrand competition. When n N = n E = 1 and v 1 = 0, each¯rm operates as a monopolist in its segment and the equilibrium does not depend on whether competition is Cournot or Bertrand.
We now show that the e®ect of the various parameters of the model on the existence of the isolated equilibrium does not depend on our assumption of Cournot competition.
Proposition 9.1. With a Bertrand duopoly, and either v 1 · v E or v 1 > v E , the isolated equilibrium is increasing in c N , S 2 , v 2 , and v E while it is decreasing in c E , S 1 , and v 1 . For°2 [°¤ 1 ;°¤ 2 ], the isolated equilibrium is increasing (decreasing)
Note that these results hold independently of the relative ranking of v 1 and v E . Thus, in addition to addressing the case of disruption from below, they also characterize the case of technology competition from above, in which the perceived quality of the new technology is higher in both the secondary and the primary segment. Examples of the latter include jet versus propeller engines in the military and commercial aircraft market; radial versus bias ply in the European and American tire markets; and xerography versus carbon paper in the large and small enterprise markets. 22 Next we turn to the e®ect of the form of competition. 22 While Cournot competition is useful for accomidating multiple¯rms using a given technology, the case of v 1 > v E is much less tractable.
23 One di®erence is that while the condition for disruption for t ! 1 is independent of v I (t)=v 1 (t) in the case of Cournot, this ratio does enter into the limit condition for Bertrand.
Endogenous Number of Firms
For the Cournot model it is possible to endogenize the number of¯rms using each technology.
24 A full analysis of the e®ect of entry on disruption requires a characterization of pro¯ts when the entry causes the isolated equilibrium to breakdown, and hence is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, a limited exploration of the topic yields some interesting insights.
Assume that there is a¯xed cost F Á for¯rms using technology Á = N; E. Let n I Á be the number of¯rms of type Á that can cover their¯xed costs under the assumption that the new technology is isolated: Proof We have that
Hence n I N is weakly increasing in v 2 and S 2 and it is weakly decreasing in c N and F N , while n I E is weakly increasing in v E and S 1 and it is weakly decreasing in c E 24 The Bertrand model with¯xed costs always results in one¯rm using each technology given that more than one¯rm of a given type results in marginal cost pricing.
and F E . We again seek to sign ¢ I . The e®ect of the¯xed costs is
As v 1 a®ects neither n 
With perfect competition (so that P Á = c Á ), market boundaries depend entirely on the relative price/performance ratio of two alternatives for customers in the primary segment. It is only when new-technology¯rms have market power that market boundaries depend on the relative size of the segments and the perceived quality in the secondary segment. 
Conclusion
Market de¯nition is usually taken as a purely empirical question. The standard approach for theoretical work in industrial organization is to take as given the set of competing¯rms and the set of relevant consumers. We take the boundaries of competition as our central research question. A better understanding of where competition emerges is important both for analyzing technology evolution and for de¯ning markets in antitrust deliberations. Inspired by recent empirical observations of disruptive technologies, we propose a novel model of horizontal and vertical di®erentiation that is well suited to addressing the boundaries of technology competition. We show that market boundaries can be shaped by the pro¯t maximizing behavior of¯rms.
To summarize our¯ndings, we start with the observation that market boundaries depend on the degree of substitution, which itself depends on price-performance ratios (Scherer, 1980) . In the context of our model, this means that the market boundary (i.e., whether the new technology enters the primary segment) depends on the price-performance ratio of the new product (P N =v 1 ) and the established product (P E =v E ), as viewed by consumers in the primary segment. Central to our theory is that these prices result from pro¯t maximizing behavior by thē rms using the technologies. Thus, for example, P E depends on the marginal cost of established products (c E ) and the number of¯rms using the established technology (n E ) and hence these factors in°uence market boundaries. For the new technology, P N not only depends on marginal costs (c N ) and the number of rms (n N ), but also on the extent to which¯rms using the new technology view consumers in the primary segment as good substitutes for those in the secondary segment in terms of volumes (S 1 =S 2 ) and quality perceptions (v 1 =v 2 ) . If the secondary segment o®fers su±ciently superior volumes and valuations, the¯rms will not choose to disrupt. Since, by de¯nition, antitrust deliberations occur in markets with small numbers, it seems important to identify the ways in which the strategic behavior of¯rms a®ects these market boundaries. Having identi¯ed the critical role played by the perceived quality levels v 1 , v 2 , and v E , we consider how these shift with consumer preferences (® i ), the new technology's trajectory (°), the extent of consumers' decreasing marginal utility from product improvements (¯) and the maturity of the new technology (t). This elaborated approach to market boundaries might be useful in antitrust settings where the analyst is trying to predict the future threat posed by substitute technologies.
The analysis of our model is not yet complete. Having addressed whether technology competition emerges, it remains to study the e®ects of such competition. We are interested in the e®ect of technology competition on the pro¯ts, market shares and concentration ratios of¯rms using each of the technologies.
While we model technology progress as exogenous, one could study the incentives of¯rms in our model to engage in product and process innovation, as well as the optimal trajectory of technology advance. It would be interesting to know how these change, as well, with the emergence of technology competition. Put another way, the question remains: How disruptive are disruptive technologies?
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.2 Note that Q E (0; P N ) = S 1 for all P N¸0 follows from v E > v 1 . If Q E > S 1 the supply of the established product exceeds the maximum demand and P E = 0, while for Q E · S 1 a market clearing price P E¸0 must exist. Further, when Q E · S 1 the established product is purchased only by those consumers in segment 1 with a su±ciently high µ, in particular by all those with
We now solve for P N (Q N ; Q E ). Suppose Q E¸S1 and hence P E = 0. Since Q N (0; 0) = S 2 , we have that for Q N > S 2 output of the new product exceeds the maximum demand and P N = 0. For Q N · S 2 a market clearing price exists and is given by
. This establishes
; 0g when Q E > S 1 . Now suppose Q E < S 1 . If all of the new product is bought by segment 2, we have the market clearing condition Q N = (1 ¡ P N =v 2 )S 2 , which yields
. The cusumer in segment 2 most tempted by the new product has µ = ¹ µ and this customer does not buy if v 1 ¹ µ · P N . Hence, none of the new product is bought by consumers in segment 2 if
then market clearing requires that S 1 (
Since Q N (0; 0) = S 1 + S 2 ¡ Q E , a value of Q N greater than this amount results in P N = 0.
We now turn to P E (Q E ; Q N ). Suppose Q E < S 1 as otherwise P E = 0. If there exists a consumer in segment 2 indi®erent between the established and new product, then the market clearing condition is
. We proceed by considering two regions of Q N .
Case 1: Q N¸S2 . Then there is always an indi®erent consumer. P N = 0 if
There is an indi®erent 
QED Proof of Lemma 4.4 We start with part (ii). If
Q I N > ¹ Q N (Q I E ) then ¼ I N = q I N (P N (Q I N ) ¡ c N ) < q I N (P N (Q I N ; Q I E ) ¡ c N ) ·1 and hence ¢ I 6 = 0. If Q I N = ¹ Q N (Q I E ) then q(P N ( ¹ Q N (Q I E ) ¡ Q I ¡k + q; Q I E ) ¡ c N ) is increasing in q for q = ¹ Q N (Q I E ) ¡ Q
@½
.
We now turn to speci¯c parameter values, starting with ½ = c N : 
sinceP < v 1 ¹ µ for the new product to be bought by consumers in segment 2.
Signing @¢ I =@S 2 using (11.3) is very tedious. Instead, note that ¼ I N = S 2 (1 ¡ c N =v 2 ) 2 =(n N + 1) 2 is proportional to S 2 while1 is proportional to (S 1 + S 2 ) and hence less than proportional to S 2 . Thus, for ¼ We start by proving that the isolated equilibrium is decreasing in t. Suppose ¢ I = 0. We have We conclude that @¢ I =@t < 0 for c E =v E (t N ) su±ciently small and Cobb-Douglas or additive exponential utility. The same result holds a fortiori for bounded or log linear since @v 2 =@t is greater relative to @ v 1 =@t with these utility functions and hence @¢ I =@t is still negative.
The isolated equilibrium decreasing in t implies that either an isolated equilibrium exists for all t¸t N or there exists a t D such that it only exists for t 2 [t N ; t D ]. 
